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Abstract. Quantum key distribution (QKD) has the potential for widespread
real-world applications, but no secure long-distance experiment has
demonstrated the truly practical operation needed to move QKD from the
laboratory to the real world due largely to limitations in synchronization and
poor detector performance. Here, we report results obtained using a fully
automated, robust QKD system based on the Bennett Brassard 1984 (BB84)
protocol with low-noise superconducting nanowire single-photon detectors
(SNSPDs) and decoy levels to produce a secret key with unconditional security
over a record 140.6 km of optical fibre, an increase of more than a factor of five
compared with the previous record for unconditionally secure key generation in
a practical QKD system.
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21. Introduction
Quantum key distribution (QKD) holds the promise of communication with security resting
firmly on the foundation of quantum mechanics rather than unproven assumptions regarding
current and future computational resources. In the Bennett Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol [1],
the most common prepare and measure protocol, the sender (Alice) ideally encodes a single
photon with a bit value of either 0 or 1 in one of two conjugate bases and sends it to the
receiver (Bob). When Bob receives a photon, he measures it in one of the two bases. Alice
and Bob then publicly share their basis choices and only keep the bits where the bases match.
Because the information is encoded in a single photon, any tampering by an eavesdropper
(Eve) results in an increased error ratio detectable by the legitimate users of the system. After
performing error correction [2] to remove any errors that may have arisen from the operations
of an eavesdropper or from imperfections in the experimental apparatus, Alice and Bob perform
a privacy amplification step [3] to erase any partial information Eve might have obtained about
the transmission. The final result is a string of 0s and 1s that Alice and Bob share but about
which Eve has negligibly small information.
Although it is straightforward to see how QKD with ideal sources and detectors is secure,
real-world QKD systems must contend with imperfect experimental components. In 2000, it was
pointed out that the use of attenuated lasers (which emit photons in a Poissonian distribution)
drastically limits the secure range of laser-based QKD systems [4]. Eve could perform a photon
number splitting (PNS) attack in which she selectively changes the channel transmittance based
on photon number but still maintains the expected rate of detections at Bob. If the rate of multi-
photon pulses at Alice is larger than the rate of photon detections at Bob, then Eve could block
all the laser pulses containing single photons, and only allow transmission of the multi-photon
pulses, which are inherently insecure. In this case, the entire string of ‘secure’ bits could, in fact,
be known to Eve.
Several methods have been proposed to mitigate the effects of PNS attacks. The most
straightforward is to simply use a very low mean photon number µ, on the order of the channel
transmittance, to guarantee that at least some of the detections at Bob originated from single
photons at Alice [4]. Unfortunately, this results in very low secret bit rates as well as greatly
limiting the possible transmission length due to dark counts in the detectors. The Scarani,
Acin, Ribordy, Gisin (SARG) protocol [5], which allows for secure bits to be formed from
both one- and two-photon signals, outperforms standard BB84, but it offers no performance
advantage compared with BB84 with ‘decoy states’ as described below [6]. Differential phase
shift QKD (DPS-QKD) is another method of protecting against PNS attacks [7], but a security
proof against all attacks for the DPS-QKD protocol does not currently exist, so it does not
provide the unconditional security needed for QKD.
The use of decoy states [8]–[11] with the BB84 protocol has provided a method for
achieving high bit rates while protecting against PNS attacks and maintaining the underlying
security of BB84. In a decoy state protocol, Alice transmits signals randomly picked from
several different mean photon levels µ j rather than just one. If Eve, who is ignorant of the
µ j value for each specific signal, were to attempt to perform a PNS attack, she would not be
able to simultaneously modify the channel transmission for all the µ j values to reproduce the
expected statistics at Bob. By comparing the number of photon detections at each mean photon
level, Alice and Bob can determine a rigorous bound on the number of single photons that have
been received by Bob and incorporate this bound into the privacy amplification step.
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3Decoy state protocols have been demonstrated over a free-space link [12] and in several
different fibre systems [13]–[21]. However, many of the demonstrations, although they are
important proof-of-principle experiments, employ bi-directional systems [13, 14, 20] that are
susceptible to Trojan horse attacks, or do not perform the full QKD protocol, including error
correction and privacy amplification, but instead only estimate the secret bit rate and range of
the system [19]. Furthermore, most fibre systems have employed either local synchronization
(transmitter and receiver share the same clock) [15, 16, 21] or synchronization over a separate
fibre [19], methods that pose a significant barrier for deployment. Although a practical uni-
directional fibre systemwith remote synchronization has been demonstrated over short distances
of 25 km with high bit rates [17, 18], the detectors used in these experiments were not
sufficiently quiet to enable long-distance fibre QKD. Here we describe the first practical fibre
QKD system capable of secure operation over distances greater than 100 km. The system uses a
three-level decoy-state protocol in a fibre phase-encoding QKD system with independent clocks
at the transmitter and receiver and low-noise superconducting nanowire single-photon detectors
(SNSPDs). In addition to being secure against PNS attacks, our data are secure against Trojan
horse attacks that afflict bi-directional systems and attacks based on differing timing responses
between detectors [22].
2. Finite statistics decoy state protocol
The security of our protocol rests on knowing the number of sifted bits arising from single
photons produced by Alice, and the disturbance, or bit error ratio, on those bits. Our approach
has been to develop a finite statistics version of Koashi’s security proof based on the uncertainty
principle [23, 24]. The resulting secret bit yield has a form that is similar to that of Gottesman
et al [25], with the addition of finite efficiency factors. The number of secret bits distilled from
each basis is calculated as
Nsecret = Nsifted
[
y−1 µe
−µ (1− fPAH2(b+1))− fECH2(B)−(1− 1fDS H2(z)
)]
, (1)
where Nsifted is the number of sifted bits in the selected basis, B is the observed bit error ratio
in this basis, y−1 is a lower bound on the transmittance of single photons, b
+
1 is an upper bound
on the single-photon bit error ratio in the conjugate basis, z is the fraction of zeroes among the
sifted bits in this basis, H2(·) is the Shannon binary entropy function, and fPA, fEC and fDS are
privacy amplification, error correction and deskewing efficiency factors needed to accommodate
the finite statistics of the data.
The decoy state protocol allows us to determine a lower bound on the single-photon
transmittance y−1 and an upper bound on the single-photon error ratio b
+
1 . The value of y
−
1 is
the minimal value of y1 satisfying the following inequalities:
Y−j 6 e−µ j
∞∑
n=0
(µ j)
n
n!
yn 6 Y +j ,
where yn is the transmittance of an n-photon signal and Y +j (Y
−
j ) is the upper (lower) bound on
the yield of detection events when mean photon number µ j is used for transmission. In contrast
to other work where Y±j are calculated assuming that the underlying detection statistics are
Gaussian, we make no such assumption and use the full binomial distribution to calculate the
bounds within a user-defined confidence level, , chosen to be 1× 10−7 for this experiment. Our
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4protocol implements key distribution in a universally composable manner [26]–[28], resulting
in a key that is  ′-secure, with  ′ 6 10 [24].
We use two methods to determine the single-photon error ratio b1. The first, referred to
as the ‘worst-case’ scenario, makes the conservative assumption that all observed errors occur
on single photons. In this case, b+1 is simply equal to the number of observed errors divided
by the number of sifted bits that arose from single photons prepared by Alice, which can be
computed from the lower bound y−1 . However, we can obtain a tighter bound on b1 by utilizing
the information contained in the differing error ratios at each µ j and constructing a set of
inequalities involving the bounds on the observed bit error ratios B j and the n-photon bit error
ratios bn:
B−j 6 e−µ j
∞∑
n=0
(µ j)
n
n!
ynbn 6 B+j .
Analogous to the method for finding y−1 , b
+
1 is found by determining the maximal value of
b1 that satisfies these inequalities. Computing this tighter bound on b1 can be carried out by
linear programming, as for y−1 , but here it is subject to quadratic constraints, so the analysis is
computationally more intensive, although still tractable. In either case, the bounds on y1 and b1
are valid even if the quantum channel is time varying [29].
Equation (1) involves three efficiency factors ( fEC, fPA and fDS) that quantify finite
statistics effects during the stages of QKD. Asymptotically, all three factors approach unity, but
for a finite session length they are strictly greater than one. Reconciliation via practical error-
correcting algorithms does not achieve the Shannon capacity of the binary symmetric channel,
and the extra overhead in parity checks that needs to be communicated between Alice and Bob
is expressed by the factor fEC. Privacy amplification involves removing any partial information
Eve may have gained by disturbing the single-photon signals that comprise the sifted bits.
Following Koashi [23], we numerically compute the logarithm (base two) of the number of
typical strings that are needed to describe with high confidence the output of a binary symmetric
channel with a given bit flip probability, using the bit error ratio in one basis to determine the
amount of privacy amplification required in the other basis. The factor fPA denotes how much
the size of this output differs from the Shannon entropy of the single-photon signals. The last
finite statistics effect we consider is due to the imbalance between the two detector efficiencies,
which leads to a bias between the 0s and 1s for the sifted bits in each basis. This bias can
reduce Eve’s search space of guessing over likely reconciled keys prior to privacy amplification.
Asymptotically, Shannon entropy again gives the required reduction in secret information, but
any practical algorithm for removing the bias, or deskewing, is likely to have inefficiencies,
which is encompassed by the factor fDS. We followed Peres [30] in iterating von Neumann’s
algorithm for generating unbiased bits out of the reconciled keys to determine the value of fDS.
3. Automated QKD system
A diagram of the automated, reconfigurable QKD system used [31] is shown in figure 1.
A 1550 nm distributed feedback laser emits photons with a 100 ps pulse width (full width
half maximum (FWHM)) at a clock rate of 10MHz, and the resulting photons are sent to
Alice’s phase encoder. The photon wavepacket is split into a ‘short’ and a ‘long’ path, and the
portion of the wavepacket that traversed the long path is modulated by the electro-optic phase
New Journal of Physics 11 (2009) 045009 (http://www.njp.org/)
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Figure 1.Optical train of the phase-encoding QKD system used in this work. The
variable optical attenuator (VOA) provides attenuation to the single-photon level,
from which the amplitude modulator provides the different µ j levels needed for
the decoy level protocol. Red lines indicate polarization maintaining fibre, and
blue lines represent single-mode fibre. Photons are detected by two SNSPDs
biased to yield matching detection efficiencies.
modulator, located outside the interferometer for stability. Likewise, the wavepacket is again
split in Bob’s decoder, and only the part of the wavepacket that travelled through Alice’s long
path is modulated. Interference ultimately occurs between the Alice-long-Bob-short and Alice-
short-Bob-long amplitudes. Polarization maintaining fibre is used within the interferometers to
ensure that these two paths are indistinguishable.
The quantum channel consists of 151.5 km of spooled dark optical fibre in an isolated
container. The measured fibre attenuation was 0.206 dB km−1, and shorter distances are obtained
by redefining Alice’s enclave to include a portion of the fibre. The bit and basis selections
at Alice and Bob are determined by the outputs of physical random number generators, and
a high-speed optical switch, driven by a pseudo-random pattern, provides the three intensity
levels needed for our decoy state protocol. (In a deployed system, the pseudo-random pattern
generator would simply be replaced by a physical random number generator.) We tested various
combinations of sending probabilities and attenuation levels to determine the accuracy of the
mean photon numbers. Including long-term drifts, the overall accuracy of the µ levels was
∼0.1 dB, which is in good agreement with the number of photons detected at Bob.
The SNSPDs [32] used for these measurements are cooled to 3K in a closed-cycle
refrigeration system and coupled to single-mode telecom fibre. They operate in ungated mode
with a measured timing jitter of 69 ps and a recovery time of <10 ns. The detectors were
individually current biased to a matching detection efficiency of 0.5%, resulting in a summed
average dark count rate over the entire acquisition period of 78.1 counts s−1.
The system is fully automated and able to run for many hours without user intervention.
Independent rubidium oscillators are employed as frequency references at Alice and Bob and
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Figure 2. Sifted bit rate and bit error ratio for entire data run. Bit rate and error
ratio are for data at µ2, and each point is an average over 60 s of acquisition time.
The dashed green line shows the average error ratio of 2.01%. Approximately
4.5 h into the data run, the bit rate fell and the error ratio increased, probably
indicating a polarization misalignment. The system was able to recover from
this error without any user intervention. Data from the entire run period were
used to make secret bits.
are synchronized prior to each QKD run. To synchronize the clocks, the mean photon number
is set to a very high value (corresponding to several thousand detection events per second at
Bob), and the received detection events are used to create a photon arrival time histogram that
is used to determine the current average frequency offset between the two oscillators, which is
corrected by adjusting one of the clocks’ frequencies. After the synchronization step but before
the QKD session, a tuning step is performed to keep the interferometer balanced. Tuning runs
are insecure sessions executed at a high photon number to quickly obtain the statistics needed
for interferometer adjustments, while QKD runs adhere to the requirements for secure key
generation. To minimize the effects of system de-tuning, tuning runs are promptly followed by
QKD runs. The use of ungated detectors and post-selection of detection timestamps in software
relaxes the system timing requirements to the phase modulator voltage pulse width, 2–3 ns,
rather than being constrained to the sub-nanosecond electrical detector gate width required for
avalanche photodiodes. However, we observed that the width of the peaks in the arrival time
histograms was typically only a few hundred picoseconds, indicating that our synchronization
scheme should work at clock rates up to 1GHz under these conditions. Periodically, the
polarization controller is automatically adjusted to compensate for any polarization drifts within
the fibre by maximizing transmission through the linear polarizer.
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Figure 3. (a) Bound on single-photon transmittance y−1 ; (b) bounds on the single-
photon error ratio b+1 assuming either the ‘worst case’ (dashed green line) or by
finding a tighter bound (solid blue line); and (c) secret bit rate using forward
error correction as a function of distance. Data were acquired over a 151.5 km
link, and the decoy levels and sending probabilities were chosen to maximize the
secret bit rate at 135 km.
4. Results and conclusions
We chose µ j values with associated sending probabilities that were near-optimal for a fibre
length of 135 km based on the results of simulations. The selected mean photon numbers
were (µ0 = 0.0025, µ1 = 0.13 and µ2 = 0.57) (µ0, ideally the vacuum state, was constrained
to be 23.5 dB below the high µ2 level by the extinction ratio of the switch) with associated
sending probabilities (0.1, 0.2, 0.7). Before each 10 s QKD run, a 1 s clock synchronization
step and two 500ms tuning runs were performed. The system was allowed to run for 20.3 h
before being stopped manually. Not including the overhead time for classical communication,
synchronization and tuning, QKD data were acquired for 5.6 h. Figure 2 displays the stability
of the sifted bit rate and bit error ratio of the system over the entire data run.
In 5.6 h of acquisition time and using a timing window of 184 ps, the number of detection
events recorded at µ2, µ1 and µ0 was 80 776, 5729 and 341, respectively, and a total of
40 538 sifted bits with a bias (fraction of zeros in one basis) of 0.494 were created. The sifted
bits and the basis choices both passed the FIPS 140–2 cryptographic randomness tests [33].
After data were collected, the bits were sifted and error corrected using either a regular (3,14)
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Figure 4. Simulated performance of system used in this work for different
acquisition times and distances. The optimal mean photon number and sending
probabilities are found for each distance and acquisition time. The data point
at 135 km matches the prediction of the simulation. Even with an efficiency of
0.5%, the SNSPDs enable the creation of secret bits out to 166.1 km.
low-density parity check forward error correction code, or the modified CASCADE protocol
for interactive error correction [34]. Using interactive error-correcting codes yields more secret
bits than forward error correction, but the security of a protocol using two-way error correction
has not yet been conclusively proven. The error-corrected bits were then privacy amplified as
described in equation (1) after determining the bounds on the single-photon transmittance and
error ratio. The efficiency factors due to the finite data size were determined to be fEC ≈ 1.06 for
the modified CASCADE protocol and fEC ≈ 1.51 for forward error correction, fPA ≈ 1.09 and
fDS ≈ 1.05. As a final step, Wegman–Carter authentication [35] was performed on the secret
bits and all the messages between Alice and Bob.
As shown in figure 3, b+1 , the bound on the single-photon error ratio, is significantly
higher when the worst-case assumption that all the errors occur on single photons is made. The
tighter b1 bound not only yields more secret bits at any given distance, but it also extends the
distance over which secret bits can be exchanged. In the case where forward error correction is
performed, use of the ‘worst-case’ b1 results in 1412 secret bits at 135 km and a maximum range
of 137.4 km. When the tighter bound on b1 is used, 3549 secret bits are produced at 135 km and
the range of the system is extended to 140.6 km, a new record for key distribution secure against
general attacks [25], including PNS attacks. Using the modified CASCADE protocol for error
correction extends the distance even further to 144.3 km.
By choosing different mean photon numbers and sending probabilities and acquiring data
for longer times, it would be possible to extend the range even further in this system. Figure 4
shows the results of simulations based on the system properties to determine the maximum
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range of 166.1 km. Although the detection efficiency of these detectors is currently quite low,
by embedding the detectors in a stack of optical elements designed to increase absorption at the
target wavelength [36] and improving the optical coupling to the detector, it should be possible
to increase the system detection efficiency considerably. An increase to 50% (assuming the
same dark count and background photon rates) would result in bit rates higher by approximately
two orders of magnitude at any given distance in the asymptotic limit, and an increase in the
tolerable link loss to over 50 dB. From our results, which are the first demonstration of assured
security over long distances in a practical system, we can infer that reasonable improvements in
component technology will result in several hundred bits per second over distances of 100 km,
more than an order of magnitude higher than what is presently available.
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